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ABSTRACT
This article investigates the impact of political association and
managerial power heterogeneity on corporate risk-taking using
data of listed companies in China from 2006 to 2015. Politically
associated companies demonstrate higher corporate risk-taking,
and the impact of managerial power thereon depends on the
source thereof. Structurally speaking, board of directors’ supervi-
sion, and shareholders’ supervision power are positively associ-
ated with corporate risk-taking, but ownership, expert, and
prestige power are negatively associated. Political association
weakens the influence of structural and prestige power on cor-
porate risk-taking and strengthens the impact of ownership and
expert power thereon. The article adds to the literature on polit-
ical association, managerial power, and corporate risk-taking.
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In recent years, risk-taking has become a focus for theorists and practitioners. It has
been shown that firms enhance their competitive advantage by investing more in
R&D and capital expenditures, which induces them to take a higher level of corporate
risk (Bargeron, Lehn, & Zutter, 2010; Hilary & Hui, 2009). At the same time, research
confirms that corporate risk-taking is not only positively correlated with asset and
sales growth (John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008), but can also significantly increase the mar-
ket value of listed companies (Xia, Ma, & Chen, 2015). However, the level of risk-tak-
ing in a company often depends on the willingness of management (Khaw, Liao,
Tripe, & Wongchoti, 2016). Private companies can gain more investment opportuni-
ties and resources by establishing formal or informal contacts with the government,
as political connections increase the investment scale and investment efficiency of
these enterprises (Chen, Jin, & Dong, 2016; Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016; Qian &
Yeung, 2015; Xu & Xiao, 2014).
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Early research on risk-taking targeted financial institutions such as banks. In recent
years, researchers have focused their empirical work on internal governance mecha-
nisms and the external environment of non-financial listed companies. The internal
governance mechanism includes the ownership structure, management incentives,
and managers’ characteristics. First, previous studies explain that the shareholding
structure affects companies’ risk-taking behaviour (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2013;
Li & Yu, 2012). Second, empirical studies on management incentives clarify how to
enhance management’s willingness to take risks (Choy, Lin, & Officer, 2014; Kempf,
Ruenzi, & Thiele, 2009; Li & Zhang, 2014; Liu, Xiao xi, Weng, & Wang, 2016).
Third, managers are the direct decision-makers regarding corporate investments, and
their personal characteristics significantly affect corporate risk-taking (Cheng, Hsu, &
Kung, 2015; Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2011).
In addition, the external environment such as market environment uncertainty, the
creditor protection mechanism, religious beliefs, official turnover, and corporate social
networks all affect the level of corporate risk exposure (Caggese, 2012; Hilary & Hui,
2009; Jian-li, 2009; Jiang, Jiang, Kim, & Zhang, 2015; Mao, Wang, & Hu, 2015; Sun
& Lu, 2017).
Next, studies on political connections and investment opportunities focus on the
impact of political connections and other regulatory variables on investment effi-
ciency (reducing or improving it); however, research on the relationship between pol-
itical connections and risk is limited (Fan, Peng, & Liu, 2016; Mao et al., 2015; Qian
& Yeung, 2015). Empirical studies on management power and investment opportuni-
ties also focus on the impact of management power on investment efficiency.
Scholars at home and abroad mostly construct the measure of management power
based on management characteristics and the strength of management power,
employing this to investigate the impact thereof on investment efficiency (Luo, 2017;
Tan & Wei, 2014; Yuan & Dai, 2016).
In summary, both internal and external governance mechanisms and the manage-
ment characteristics of the company may affect corporate risk-taking. However, the
existing literature does not focus on the impact of the heterogeneity of management
power on risk-taking. Moreover, political connection has not been neglected in deci-
sion-making in corporate investment behaviour. Therefore, this study examines
whether political connection will affect the impact of management power heterogen-
eity on risk-taking. As such, this study focuses on the following questions.
a. Do political connections support private companies to avail more investment
opportunities?
b. What is the impact of political connections on investment decisions in pri-
vate companies?
c. Is there an association between management power and the level of risk-taking
in private companies?
To answer these questions, data were collected of A-share private Chinese compa-
nies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for the period 2006 to
2015. Furthermore, a fixed effects regression technique was applied to 1,590 firm-year
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observations. The results of this study imply that the role of managerial power in
venture capital decision-making in companies is not necessarily negative. Highly edu-
cated or experienced managers are more likely to recognise their own project deci-
sion-making potential and may be more proactive in capturing high-risk, high-return
investment projects. At the same time, political affiliations enhance management’s
willingness to invest, affecting the role of management power in risk-taking.
Therefore, enterprises should rationally allocate and actively supervise the manage-
ment power structure and make efficient use of the policy resources and investment
opportunities provided through political connections. In addition, they should pay
attention to investing in riskier projects.
This study is significant, as the data set and time duration are extensive. After the
introduction, the article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the litera-
ture and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 clarifies data collection and describes the
methodology. Section 4 provides and discusses the empirical results, while in section 5,
the conclusion is discussed and policy implications highlighted. Finally, the references
are provided.
2. Literature review
Corporate risk-taking is strongly dependent on the input of economic resources. If a
company cannot obtain sufficient resources to support its investments, it may face
great losses resulting from low investment efficiency and even investment failure. The
required resources for a company’s risk-taking behaviour include investment projects,
capital, technology, land, and the channels of product sales. Politically affiliated com-
panies have political resources (informal relationship with governments), which in
the unique Chinese business environment can help private enterprises obtain and
reduce the cost of access to additional economic resources (Chen et al., 2016; Wang,
Liu, School, & University, 2016). Two performance aspects have been identified
regarding political connections. First, political affiliation can bring policy resources
(such as more bank loans at a lower interest rate, financial subsidies, and tax prefer-
ences) to private companies through increasing corporate social capital (Qian &
Yeung, 2015, Faccio et al., 2016). These policy resources provide assurances to com-
panies, leading them to assume a higher level of risk-taking, because higher-risk proj-
ects need more economic and political resources. Second, companies with political
affiliations usually have lower coordination costs with the government than those not
politically affiliated. Political relations can help private enterprises enter the industry,
which is controlled by the government, and engage in lower-risk diversification (Luo,
2017). When private companies choose a higher level of risk-taking, they can greatly
reduce the uncertainty of investment projects, have lower coordination costs, and
have a stronger need to invest in riskier projects by establishing a relationship with
the government. The main reason is that a political relationship provides assurance to
private companies in terms of acquiring more returns when they engage in higher
risk-taking (Fan et al., 2016). Based on the above analysis, the following hypothesis
is proposed:
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Hypothesis-1: Politically associated companies engage in a higher level of risk-taking
behaviour than non-politically associated companies.
2.1. Management power and risk-taking
A typical characteristic of a modern enterprise is the separation of ownership and
management. Management has the right to allocate all available resources and select
the level of risk-taking. Management power is reflected in the power of large share-
holders in Chinese private enterprises (Rui, 2008). Finkelstein (1992) defines manage-
ment power as the ability of management to perform its own will and delineates this
power into four dimensions: prestige power, expert power, ownership power, and
organisational power. However, based on the classification by Finkelstein (1992), Frey
and Kucher (1999), Wang et al. (2016) and Daft and Daft (2009), this article summa-
rises its roles and divides it into two categories. The first is the power accumulated
by managers themselves (including ownership power, prestige power, and expert
power), and the second the power authorised by the organisation (including struc-
tural power, board of directors’ supervision power, and shareholders’ supervision
power). This is because the management power of private companies mainly stems
from the prestige power formed by private entrepreneurs in the process of starting
and expanding the company, as well as the ownership power from shareholders as
the concurrent executives. If private companies are managed by professional manag-
ers, then management power is often bestowed or authorised by the organisation (Liu
et al., 2016, Choy et al., 2014, Caggese, 2012).
Management controls corporate investment activities, and investment willingness is
influenced by the various sources of management power (Luo, 2017, Yuan & Dai,
2016). Large shareholders have two attitudes toward the companies they control.
First, most executives are family members or appointed through a family relationship
(Liu et al., 2016). Management receives much surplus control and is closely related
with the future of the company. Here, the focus is on the long-term interests of the
company, and managers have more management power based on their experience
than that bestowed by the organisation. Although management has great power, it
pays more attention to the long-term stability and sustainable development of the
company, because the management team is also shareholders (Li & Zhang, 2014). To
improve long-term performance, managers generally choose capital expenditure and
innovation as well as other high risk-taking projects. Second, most management
members of the company are professional managers, who have more management
power than that based on experience only (Cheng et al., 2015, Faccio et al., 2011,
Kempf et al., 2009). As there is a principal–agent problem between shareholders and
management, managers may face an ethical risk and adverse selection to maximise
their own interests. In addition, the professional managers’ power bestowed by the
organisation is often short term and only effective during the period of office.
Generally, professional managers invest their human capital in one corporation, and
it is difficult to disperse human capital across organisations. For the abovementioned
reasons, professional managers tend to avoid risks, instead pursuing the stability pro-
vided by their remuneration and career. To achieve its own interests, management
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often chooses conventional, low-risk investment projects (Cheng et al., 2015). Its will-
ingness to bear risk is weak. Based on the above analysis, the second hypothesis is
proposed as follows:
Hypothesis-2a: Managerial power based on managers’ own experiences and prestige is
positively associated with risk-taking.
Hypothesis-2b: Managerial power authorised by the organisation is negatively associated
with risk-taking.
2.2. Political connection, management power heterogeneity, and risk-taking
Corporate risk-taking is not only the result of management choice, but also depends
on the size of input resources of a company’s investment. Political connections can
provide companies’ with more external resources than those available through their
own capacity (Sun & Lu, 2017, Mao et al., 2015, Caggese, 2012). The political connec-
tion is the external capital of the company, while management power belongs to the
internal governance. Furthermore, this political connection may influence the rela-
tionship between management power and risk-taking. The policy resources provided
through political linkages decrease the risk of investment projects, possibly increasing
the willingness of management to invest in riskier projects.
Considering the scarcity of political resources, shareholders may not dismiss man-
agement when they face the risk of investment failure. Therefore, managers may
assume a lower risk to themselves when deciding on the level of risk-taking (Cheng
et al., 2015, Faccio et al., 2011). Furthermore, local governments can provide more
government subsidies to private companies when these fail to trigger operational
risks, as the local government has the responsibility to promote economic growth,
increase employment, and other economic and political goals (Hu & Shi, 2008). Local
governments may bailout the company should their investment fail. Accordingly,
managers with more prestige and expert power may choose high risk-taking projects,
because of the low risk to themselves. In addition, managers with more organisational
power may also choose high-risk investment projects due to availability of inside
information and possible bailouts. Based on the above discussion, the following
hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis-3a: Political connection strengthens the positive correlation between managerial
power (based on managers’ own experiences and prestige) and risk-taking.
Hypothesis-3b: Political connection weakens the negative correlation between managerial
power (authorised by the organisation) and risk-taking.
3. Data, variables, and research methodology
3.1. Sample selection
The object of this study was A-share private companies listed on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange China for the 10 consecutive years from 2006 to 2015. To
this end, the prior four years of rolling standard deviation of return on assets
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(R.O.A.) was taken. The data were derived from the C.E.E.R. database, C.S.M.A.R.
database, and Sina Finance Channel. Information on political connections was
extracted from personal resumes in the management information obtained from the
C.S.M.A.R. database and Sina Finance Network. The data were screened according to
the following criteria: (1) Exclude the special treatment (S.T.) and particular transfer
(P.T.) of private companies, because of their continuous loss during the past two
years to avoid financial abnormality and an abnormal level of risk-taking; and (2)
Exclude those with more than two missing variables among managerial power, polit-
ical connection, or other control variables. Based on these criteria and after screening,
1,590 firm-year observations of 318 firms were obtained. Furthermore, we winsorised
the data at the 1% level.
3.2. Dependent variable
In this study risk was the dependent variable, which we measured following the
methods proposed by John et al. (2008), Faccio et al. (2011), and Faccio et al. (2016).
As such, we calculated the R.O.A.s (E.B.I.T./total assets) for each firm in each year.
Furthermore, we calculated the mean R.O.A. for each industry in each year, and then
deducted the mean industry R.O.A. from the firm R.O.A. for the same year. The






where N is the total number of enterprises in an industry to which the company
belongs. Furthermore, we calculated the four-year rolling standard deviation of the
industry adjusted R.O.A. using equation (1):














where ROAit is return on assets for ith firm at time t, and r denotes the standard
deviation, i.e., rolling standard deviation over four consecutive years (2006–2009,
2007–2010, 2008–2011, 2009–2012, 2010–2013, 2011–2014, 2012–2015).
3.3. Independent variables
3.3.1. Managerial power
We adopted the method of Xiaofeng and Shinong (2010) and Xia et al. (2015) to
measure management power based on management’s personal characteristics. We
postulated that the exercise of management power would be restricted by the board
of directors and shareholders. Following the categories, qualitative measures were
taken according to their sources.
1. Managerial power accumulated by managers themselves: (i) Ownership power
was measured as the shareholding ratio of the general manager over total shares.
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If general managers have a higher shareholding ratio, they would have more
impact on voting rights in general meetings and ultimately possess more deci-
sion-making power; (ii) Prestige power was measured as managers’ highest edu-
cational degree. Managers with a high level of education have a stronger ability
to manage and operate the enterprise; thus, they ultimately possess more reputa-
tional power; and (iii) Managerial expert power refers to the ability to cope with
risks and emergencies. We measured this construct as general managers’ years of
service. The longer the service duration, the more efficient will the general man-
ager be when dealing with risky events and emergencies.
2. Managerial power bestowed by the organisation: (i) Structural power is defined
as whether the Chief Executive Officer (C.E.O.) and chairman of the board of
directors are the same person. If so, the C.E.O. has a greater impact on the man-
agement of the board; (ii) Board of directors’ supervision power was measured
according to the size of the board. The board can play its supervisory role more
efficiently if the size of the board is large; (iii) Shareholders’ supervision power
was measured as the Z-index (the shareholding ratio of the first largest share-
holder over the sum of the shareholding ratio of the second to tenth largest
shareholders). When the largest shareholder of the company can control and
strengthen the company, managerial power is weakened, as the largest share-
holder has more impetus to bolster supervision.
3.4. Control variables
Following other studies (Cheng et al., 2015; Faccio et al., 2011, Faccio et al., 2016;
John et al., 2008), we took the average age of directors, supervisors, and senior man-
agement as well as their gender ratio, growth rate of income of the main business,
asset-liability ratio, Tobin-Q, asset turnover, company age, firm size, industry, and
year as control variables. Their proxies and model name are explained in Table 1.
3.5. Political connection
In this study, we defined political connection as senior managers’ political affilia-
tions. Political affiliation is defined as a political connection when a company’s
chairman, C.E.O., or directors served as officials of the central government, local
government, industry (bureau), or were Communist Party cadres, or elected depu-
ties or C.P.P.C.C. members (Wu, Wu, Zhou, & Wu 2012; Yu, Li, & Pan, 2013, Fan
et al. 2016).
3.6. Model design
The following regression models were employed to test the hypotheses.
Model (1) studied the impact of political connection on the level of corporate risk-
taking as follows:
Riskit ¼ a0 þ a1Politicit þ a2
X
Contit þ Indi þ yrt þ eit::: (1)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1380 B.-F. CHAI AND S. S. MIRZA
where Riskit is the four-year rolling standard deviation of the industry adjusted
ROAit, a0 is a constant term, and Politicit is the dummy variable for political associ-
ation. The value of Politicit is “1” if a firm has a political connection and “0” other-
wise. Furthermore, a1 is the coefficient for Politicit, Contit is the control variable
(mage, gender, growth, lev, Tobin-Q, turnover, age, size), a2 is the coefficient for
Contit, Indi is the industry dummy, Yrt is the year dummy to control for industry
and year effect respectively, and eit is the standard error.
Model (2) was formulated to study the impact of managerial power on corporate
risk-taking level:




Contit þ Indi þ yrt þ eit::: (2)
where Riskit is the four-year rolling standard deviation of the industry adjusted
ROAit, b0 is the constant term, Pwit represents the different types of managerial
power accumulated by managers (Pw1-OP, Pw1-PP, Pw1-EP) and authorised by the
organisation (Pw2-SP, Pw2-BP, Pw2-HP), b1 is the coefficient of Pwit, Contit repre-
sents the control variables (mage, gender, growth, lev, Tobin-Q, turnover, age, size),
b2 is the coefficient of Contit, Indi is the industry dummy, Yrt is the year dummy to
control for the effects of industry and year, and eit is the standard error.
Model (3) was formulated to determine the moderating impact of political connec-
tion on the relationship between managerial power and corporate risk-taking:





Contit þ Indi þ yrt þ eit:::
(3)
where Riskit is the four-year rolling standard deviation of the industry adjusted
ROAit, c0 is a constant term, Politicit is the dummy variable for political association.
The value of Politicit is “1” if a firm has a political association and “0” otherwise.
Furthermore, c1 is the coefficient of Politicit, Pwit represents different types of man-
agerial power accumulated by managers (Pw1-OP, Pw1-PP, Pw1-EP) and authorised
by the organisation (Pw2-SP, Pw2-BP, Pw2-HP), c2 is the coefficient of Pwit,
PoliticitPwit is the interaction term of Politic with different types of managerial
power and c3 the coefficient thereof, Contit represents the control variables (mage,
gender, growth, lev, Tobin-Q, turnover, age, size), c4 is the coefficient of Contit, Indi
is the industry dummy, Yrt is the year dummy to control for the effect of industry
and year respectively, and eit is the standard error.
We considered the fixed effects technique as appropriate following similar studies
(Bayrakdaroglu, Ege, & Yazici, 2013; Iqbal, Ahsan, & Zhang, 2016; Sheikh & Qureshi,
2014) and the results of the Hausman specification test (Baltagi, 2005).
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables. The average of the four-
year rolling standard deviation of the R.O.A. of Chinese privately owned companies
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from 2006 to 2015 is 3.310, with a minimum value of 0.510 and maximum of 15.430.
These statistics indicate large differences in the level of risk-taking among companies.
Politics scored an average of 0.700, indicating that 70% of the sample companies
were politically connected during the sample period. This confirms that most pri-
vately owned companies have political connections.
For managerial power, the Pw1-OP has a mean of 1.610, meaning that the average
shareholding percentage of the C.E.O. is 1.610%. However, some C.E.O.s owned a
maximum of 31.370% of the total shares, while others did not hold a single share.
The mean of Pw1-PP was 2.350 and the median 2.000. This indicates that the average
educational background of C.E.O.s in the sample was a bachelor’s degree, although
the maximum educational level of a C.E.O. in any company was a doctorate degree
as mode value of Pw1-PP ¼ 4.000. The mean of Pw1-EP was 3.980, indicating that in
our sample, the average experience of the C.E.O. was four years. The mean of the
Pw2-SP was 0.200, indicating that the chairman of the board also served as the
C.E.O. in about 20% of the sample. The mean value of Pw2-BP was 0.360, confirming
that the average number of board members in Chinese firms is 4. Pw2-HP scored a
mean value of 12.570, meaning that on average, the largest shareholder is 12.570
times the sum of the second to tenth largest shareholder of the firm. This means that
the largest shareholder has more ownership, and thus, more supervision power in
Chinese firms than the sum of the second to tenth largest shareholders.
For control variables, the mean value of Mage was 47 years, indicating that the
average age of the board of directors in Chinese firms is 47 years. The maximum age
was 57 years. The mode value for gender was 0.2 with mean (0.83) and median
(0.85), meaning that more than 80% of supervisors are male. The mean value of
growth was 21.670; thus, the growth rate of the main business of Chinese companies
is almost 22%. The mean value of lev is 47.670, showing that on average, 48% of the
financing of Chinese firms is debt financing. Tobin-Q scored an average value of
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean Median Mode STD. Maximum Minimum
Risk 1590 3.310 2.500 N/A 2.710 15.430 0.510
Politic 1590 0.700 1.000 1 0.460 1.000 0.000
Pw1-OP 1590 1.610 0.000 0 5.300 31.370 0.000
Pw1-PP 1590 2.350 2.000 4 0.880 4.000 0.000
Pw1-EP 1590 3.980 4.000 2 2.840 12.000 0.000
Pw2-SP 1590 0.200 0.000 1 0.400 1.000 0.000
Pw2-BP 1590 0.360 0.000 1 0.480 1.000 0.000
Pw2-HP 1590 –12.570 –4.450 1.38 22.460 –1.010 –142.330
Mage 1590 46.990 47.000 48 3.450 57.000 35.56
Gender 1590 0.830 0.850 0.2 0.110 1.000 0.000
Growth 1590 21.670 11.240 0.19 74.200 626.090 –77.690
Lev 1590 47.670 48.720 0.30 18.500 85.490 6.200
Tobin-Q 1590 2.170 1.730 0 1.320 8.450 0.890
Size 1590 21.840 21.770 N/A 1.030 24.650 19.470
Age 1590 2.740 2.770 2.71 0.280 3.500 1.390
Turnover 1590 72.580 62.550 0.31 51.050 309.800 5.100
Note: The table presents the descriptive statistics of dependent, explanatory and control variables included in our
study. Pw2-HP represents Z value (shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder/sum of shareholding ratio of
the second to tenth largest shareholders). We multiply Z value with (–) to have a direct relationship of Holders’
supervision power with Risk-taking in line with other two proxies of Managerial Power authorised by the organisa-
tion (Pw2) i.e., Structural power or Duality and Board of directors’ supervision power.
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2.170, indicating that Chinese firms have a 2.170 times higher market than book
value. The maximum value was 8.5 times. The mean (21.840) and median (21.770) of
company size show that almost half the Chinese firms included in our study are of
average size. The mean (2.740) and median (2.770) of firm age show that almost half
the Chinese companies included in our study are of average age. The mean of the
turnover ratio shows that on average, the operating income of Chinese companies is
72.580 times greater than their average total assets.
4.2. Correlation analysis
To initially analyse the relationship between variables, we also conducted a correl-
ation analysis. As shown in Table 3, risk and politics were significantly and positively
correlated at the 1% level, indicating that political connections can promote corporate
risk (hypothesis-1). The abovementioned relationship is a simple correlation, and a
regression analysis is needed to provide a more rigorous explanation of hypothesis-1.
Moreover, the largest absolute value of any pair-wise correlation coefficient between
all variables in the same model was 0.468, indicating that no serious multicollinearity
existed between variables in the same model.
4.3. Univariate analysis
Table 4 shows the differences in risk-taking among different groups of companies
after they were categorised according to political connection and managerial power.
The average level of risk-taking in politically affiliated firms was 3.489, and 2.881 in
non-politically affiliated ones. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
These results confirm hypothesis-1 of our study, clarifying that politically affiliated
companies take more risk than non-politically affiliated ones. Among the sub-samples
of the managerial power group, the mean risk-taking level of the high-shareholding
group (mean ¼ 3.358) and group with a lower level of education (mean ¼ 3.275) was
higher than that of the low-shareholding (mean ¼ 2.976) and highly educated groups
(mean ¼ 3.339) respectively. Furthermore, the difference between the high and low-
shareholding groups was statistically significant, while the difference between the
highly educated and less educated group was statistically insignificant. Furthermore,
the mean of the risk-taking level of the highly experienced group of C.E.O.s (mean ¼
3.425) was higher than the group of C.E.O.s with less experience (mean ¼ 3.199).
This difference was statistically significant at the 10% level, and clarifies that more
experienced C.E.O.s take more risk than new or less experienced C.E.O.s.
Moreover, the mean (3.282) of the risk-taking level is lower when the C.E.O. and
chairman of the board are different people compared to the mean (3.401) when the
C.E.O. is also the chairman. However, this difference was statistically insignificant.
Furthermore, the difference between the mean of the risk-taking level of boards with
a high or low number of members as well as high and low shareholding ratio by the
largest shareholder was statistically insignificant. In addition, we analysed the differ-
ences in the median of each group. The results were in line with those for the mean
differences, excepting for structural power or duality groups. The test results confirm
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that the median of the two groups was statistically significant at the 10% level which
confirm the studies by Chen et al. (2016), Faccio et al. (2016), Cheng et al. (2015)
and Caggese (2012).
4.4. Regression analysis
4.4.1. Political connection and risk-taking
Table 5 provides the results of the fixed effects analysis for model (1). Column (1) of
Table 5 shows the regression results of the control variables when the dummy
Politicit is 0, while column (2) shows the regression results when the dummy is 1.
After controlling management characteristics, firm characteristics, industry, and time
effect to risk exposure, the regression coefficient for Politicit was 0.373, which is sig-
nificant at the 1% level. This shows that politically associated enterprises demonstrate
a higher level of risk-taking behaviour than non-politically associated ones (hypoth-
esis-1). Furthermore, the relationship of image, gender, Tobin-Q, size, and turnover
ratio with risk-taking is insignificant for politically and non-politically connected
firms. We also determined a significant positive relationship between growth and
risk-taking for both types of companies, verifying that growing firms take more risk,
regardless of political association. Moreover, we identified significant negative rela-
tionships for lev and age with risk-taking for both types of companies. This implies
that highly levered and older companies take less risk, regardless of political
association.
4.4.2. Management power heterogeneity and risk-taking
Table 6 provides the results of the fixed effects analysis for model (2). Columns
(1)–(3) show the impact of management power (accumulated by managers) on risk-
taking. The three regression coefficients of Pw1 were significant and positive, indicat-
ing that management’s power can raise the level of corporate risk-taking. Columns
(4)–(6) show the impact of management’s power (accumulated by the organisation)
Table 4. Univariate analysis.
Mean test Median test
Obs. mean T-value Median Z-value
Political Connection Non-Political 478 2.881 –4.125 2.268 –3.78
Political 1112 3.489 2.584
Ownership Power Higher Group 1376 3.358 1.917 2.544 2.081
Lower Group 214 2.976 2.271
Prestige Power Higher Group 818 3.275 –0.473 2.466 –0.840
Lower Group 772 3.339 2.525
Expert Power Higher Group 753 3.425 1.662 2.590 1.990
Lower Group 837 3.199 2.404
Structural Power No duality 1266 3.282 –0.701 2.451 –1.657
Duality 324 3.401 2.671
Board of directors’ supervision Power Higher Group 1021 3.293 –0.263 2.503 –0.506
Lower Group 569 3.330 2.468
Holders’ supervision Power Higher Group 376 3.476 1.387 2.590 0.628
Lower Group 1214 3.254 2.470
Note: The table represents the results of mean deviation test (t-test) and the median deviation test (Wilcoxon rank
sum test). ,  and  represent the significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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on risk-taking. The three regression coefficients for Pw2 were significant and nega-
tive, meaning that when the organisation empowers management, the level of corpor-
ate risk-taking is reduced. These results verify hypothesis-2a and hypothesis-2b of our
study and explain that managers are more inclined to take a higher level of risk when
their power is based on their own experiences and prestige, rather than bestowed or
authorised by the organisation.
The significant positive coefficient (0.018) of Pw1-OP indicates that when general
managers/C.E.O.s hold a larger proportion of shares, they may take more risky deci-
sions. This may be because when making investment decisions, management – as
owners – considers both its own short-term and long-term interests. The significant
positive coefficient (0.192) of Pw1-PP indicates that the higher the education of
C.E.O.s, the more able they are to use their professional knowledge to accurately
grasp the expected return on investment projects and risk. Therefore, they may be
more inclined to undertake risky projects. The significant positive coefficient (0.025)
of Power1-EP indicates that the level of corporate risk exposure is significant and
positively related to the experience of the C.E.O. This shows that a C.E.O. with a lon-
ger tenure is considered more experienced to deal with risky events and emergencies,
and thus, has a lower probability of investment failure.
Furthermore, we found a significant negative (–0.291) relationship between
Pw2-SP and risk. Thus, when C.E.O.s also serve as the chairman of the board, they
take less risky decisions. Possibly, high management power makes them risk averse.
The significant negative coefficient (-0.166) of Pw2-BP indicates that having fewer
members on the board of directors provides more power to management, making it
risk averse. The significant negative coefficient (0.005) of Pw2-HP shows that the
largest shareholder with a lower ratio of ownership will have less controlling power
and consequently, less management concern. Therefore, management will ultimately
have greater management power and be more inclined to engage in highly risky
investments.
Table 5. Political connection and risk-taking.
Non-Politically Connected Firms Politically Connected Firms
Coef. T-Statistics Coef. T-Statistics
Constant 8.094 (2.62) 8.382 (2.67)
Politic 0.373 (4.41)
Mage –0.001 (–0.04) –0.005 (–0.20)
Gender 0.854 (1.13) 0.888 (1.21)
Growth 0.002 (2.08) 0.001 (2.10)
Lev –0.016 (–2.34) –0.016 (–2.40)
Tobin-Q –0.013 (–0.20) –0.021 (–0.33)
Size –0.075 (–0.54) –0.108 (–0.80)
Age –0.704 (–3.18) –0.578 (–2.80)






Prob> F 0.000 0.000
Note: The table presents the results of fixed effects model to analyse the impact of political connection on the level
of risk-taking. ,  and  represent the significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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4.4.3. Political association, management power heterogeneity, and risk-taking
Table 7 provides the results of the fixed effects analysis for model (3), which explains
the impacts of political association and management power heterogeneity on the level
of risk-taking. Each column in Table 7 includes the dummy Politicit, one type of
Power variable (Pw1-OP, Pw1-PP, Pw1-EP, Pw2-SP, Pw2-BP, Pw2-HP), and the inter-
action term of the dummy Politicit. The Power variable was included in the model
plus the control variables.1 The regression coefficients for Politicit in columns (1)–(6)
are positive at the 1% significance level, in line with previous results (model 1). In
addition, the regression coefficient for Pw1 in columns (1)–(3) was significant and
positive (except Pw1-EP), and that for Pw2 in columns (4)–(6) significant and nega-
tive, consistent with previous results (model 2). This similarity between results dem-
onstrates the robustness of the study.
The regression coefficient of Pw1-OP (0.015) in column (1) was positive at the
10% significance level, while the coefficient of the dummy interaction of Pw1-OP
with Politicit (Politic  Pw1OP) was significant and positive at the 1% level
Table 6. Management power heterogeneity and risk-taking.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk
Constant 8.258 7.614 8.097 8.555 8.532 8.152













Mage –0.001 0.001 –0.004 –0.003 –0.001 –0.003
(–0.02) (0.05) (–0.14) (–0.12) (–0.04) (–0.09)
Gender 0.830 0.815 0.898 0.864 0.818 0.858
(1.10) (1.12) (1.16) (1.13) (1.09) (1.19)
Growth 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.09) (2.10) (1.85) (2.18) (2.08) (2.06)
Lev –0.016 –0.016 –0.015 –0.015 –0.015 –0.016
(–2.39) (–2.38) (–2.17) (–2.26) (–2.28) (–2.42)
Tobin-Q –0.008 –0.014 –0.013 –0.019 –0.018 –0.008
(–0.12) (–0.22) (–0.21) (–0.29) (–0.27) (–0.12)
Size –0.076 –0.090 –0.071 –0.100 –0.083 –0.063
(–0.55) (–0.65) (–0.53) (–0.77) (–0.58) (–0.46)
Age –0.769 –0.596 –0.767 –0.621 –0.733 –0.835
(–3.86) (–2.43) (–3.20) (–2.80) (–3.07) (–3.21)
Turnover 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.91) (0.81) (1.12) (0.90) (0.91) (0.91)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1590 1590 1590 1590 1590 1590
R-Square 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
F(24,317) 51.23 45.67 49.32 50.77 68.35 108.09
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The table presents the results of fixed effects model to analyse the impact of different types of management
powers on risk-taking level. ,  and  represent the significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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(0.060), indicating that political connection strengthens the impact of manage-
ment ownership on the level of corporate risk-taking (hypothesis-3a). The regression
coefficient of Pw1-PP (0.177) in column (2) was positive at the 1% significance
level, while the coefficient of the dummy interaction of Pw1-PP with Politicit
(Politic  Pw1 PP) became significant and negative at the 5% level (–0.109). This
Table 7. Political association, management power heterogeneity and risk-taking.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Results
Constant 7.847 8.050 8.702 9.510 8.462 8.408
(2.37) (2.49) (2.89) (3.36) (2.52) (2.77)
Politic 0.367 0.335 0.390 0.324 0.362 0.367

























Mage –0.007 –0.002 –0.007 –0.008 –0.004 –0.007
(–0.28) (–0.06) (–0.25) (–0.32) (–0.15) (–0.25)
Gender 0.915 0.807 0.936 0.936 0.827 0.919
(1.38) (1.15) (1.24) (1.30) (1.09) (1.22)
Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(2.15) (2.09) (1.85) (2.42) (2.13) (2.07)
Lev –0.017 –0.016 –0.015 –0.016 –0.016 –0.016
(–2.48) (–2.45) (–2.20) (–2.39) (–2.32) (–2.50)
Tobin-Q –0.010 –0.024 –0.024 –0.017 –0.027 –0.014
(–0.15) (–0.38) (–0.39) (–0.27) (–0.43) (–0.23)
Size –0.093 –0.121 –0.117 –0.153 –0.113 –0.095
(–0.69) (–0.89) (–0.89) (–1.23) (–0.80) (–0.71)
Age –0.494 –0.519 –0.696 –0.587 –0.500 –0.707
(–2.49) (–2.28) (–2.80) (–4.23) (–1.91) (–3.05)
Turnover 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.92) (0.87) (1.23) (1.01) (0.98) (0.82)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1590 1590 1590 1590 1590 1590
R-Square 0.031 0.0292 0.0289 0.0351 0.0286 0.029
F(26,317) 80.61 93.83 75.62 50.32 71.77 96.52
Prob> F 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: The table presents the results of fixed effects model to analyse the impact of political association combined
with different types of management powers on risk-taking level. ,  and  represent the significance level at
1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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indicates that political connection significantly weakens the positive impact of man-
agement’s reputation (education) on risk-taking. This could be attributed to the fact
that private enterprises can easily gain the benefits of non-market competition by
establishing political connections, which weakens the motivation and role of the
C.E.O. or management. The regression coefficient of Pw1-EP (0.020) in column (3)
was positive, but not significant, while the coefficient of the dummy interaction of
Pw1-EP with Politicit (Politic  Pw1 EP) was significant and positive at the 1% level
(0.069). This indicates that political connection strengthens the impact of manage-
ment’s expertise on the level of corporate risk-taking (hypothesis-3a).
Furthermore, the regression coefficient of Pw2-SP (–0.257) in column (4) was
negative at the 1% significance level, and in contrast, the coefficient of the dummy
interaction of Pw2-SP with Politicit (Politic  Pw2 SP) was significant and positive
at the 1% level (1.208). The relationships described above clarify that when the
C.E.O. is the chairman of the board and has a political connection, his/her power is
doubled, increasing the level of corporate risk-taking (hypothesis-3b).
The regression coefficient of Pw2-BP (–0.146) in column (5) was negative at the
1% significance level, while the coefficient of the dummy interaction of Pw2-BP with
Politicit (Politic  Pw2 BP) was negative (–0.249), but insignificant. This insignifi-
cant relationship alongside the significantly positive relationship between Politicit and
corporate risk-taking indicates that the resources stemming from the political connec-
tion will increase the level of corporate risk-taking, but not significantly affect man-
agement’s investment decisions. The regression coefficient of Pw2-HP (–0.005) in
column (6) is significant and negative at the 5% level, while the coefficient of the
dummy interaction of Pw2-HP with Politicit (Politic  Pw2HP) is positive, but not
significant (0.003). The insignificance of the interaction term between political con-
nection and shareholders’ checks clarifies that political connections will not affect the
supervisory role of the largest shareholder when considering corporate risk exposure.
The regression results in columns (1) and (3) verify hypothesis-3a of our study while
the results in column (4), (5) and (6) verify hypothesis-3b.
4.5. Robustness test
We employed two types of managerial power, eight control variables, and political
association as a categorical variable. For this large number of variables, autocorrel-
ation and multicollinearity may have been an issue. The results of the variation infla-
tion factor (V.I.F.) provide the highest V.I.F., which is less than 10. As such,
multicollinearity was not an issue (Nachane, 2006; Ott & Longnecker, 2001).
Furthermore, to ensure the validity and robustness of the results, we performed post-
estimation tests including the modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity in
the fixed effect regression model and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the
panel data. As a remedy for autocorrelation, we used robust standard errors adjusted
for heteroskedasticity, and clustered the robust standard errors adjusted for clusters
in panels (firms).
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5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
This study examined the impact of political connection and managerial power on the
risk-taking behaviour of Chinese listed firms by examining the consecutive A-share
non-financial private listed companies in China from 2006 to 2015. The empirical
results confirmed the following:
1. The political association of private listed companies in China has a significant
positive impact on risk-taking. Companies with political connections tend to
engage in aggressive investment decisions. Therefore, they should appropriately
handle political connections, use political resources correctly, and adapt to
China’s transformation environment under the premise of lawful compliance.
2. The managerial power of different sources impacts the risk-taking of private
companies in different ways. Specifically, the combination of the general man-
ager/C.E.O. and chairman of the board leads to a lower level of risk-taking, while
having a highly educated management team increases the tendency to invest in
riskier projects. Accordingly, a highly educated management team will increase
the level of risk-taking in private companies and the value of the enterprise.
Furthermore, the longer the term of the general manager/C.E.O., the higher is
the level of risk-taking in the company. One reason may be that these managers
learn how to tackle various situations through experience. Furthermore, the
stronger the controlling power of the largest shareholder, the lower the level of
corporate risk-taking (Cheng et al., 2015). This shows that large shareholders in a
company act as supervisors, restricting management from taking extra risk.
3. Finally, the interaction effect of political connection and managerial power
reveals that political connection strengthens ownership, expert, and the board of
directors’ supervisory power, and consequently, promotes corporate risk-taking.
The results also confirm that the management power accumulated by manage-
ment reinforces their risk-taking behaviour, while that bestowed by the organisa-
tion weakens it, making them risk averse. However, reputation power plays a
lesser role in risk-taking.
This study has certain limitations as well. Firstly, unique Chinese environment
makes the generalisability of the study difficult particularly in developed economies.
Secondly, short time span covered also limits the conclusion drawn. Therefore, simi-
lar study in developed economy and longer time span will further deepen our under-
standing of the relationship.
The results of this article imply that highly educated or experienced managers are
more likely to recognise their own potential during project decision-making and may
be more proactive in capturing high-risk, high-return investment projects. At the
same time, political affiliations enhance management’s willingness to invest in riskier
projects, and an organisation’s power structure affects corporate risk-taking.
Therefore, enterprises should rationally allocate and actively supervise the manage-
ment power structure and efficiently use the policy resources and investment oppor-
tunities provided through political connections. Finally, they should pay attention
while investing in risky projects.
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Notes
1. We include the interaction term of Politic with one type of Power variable individually in
each model to avoid multicollinearity.
2. We multiply Z value with ( - ) to have a direct relationship of Holders’ supervision power
with Risk-taking in line with other two proxies of Managerial Power authorised by
the organisation (Pw2) i.e., Structural power or Duality and Board of directors’
supervision power.
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